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Footnotes
1. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (this issue), available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/AJAWhitePaper9-26-07.pdf. 
2. See generally, Richard L. Wiener, Law and Everyday Decision
Making: Rational, Descriptive, and Normative Models, in SOCIAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 3, 3-32 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007); Sean M.
Lane & Christian A. Meissner, A “Middle Road” Approach to
Bridging the Basic-Applied Divide in Eyewitness Identification
Research, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 779 (2008).
3. The justice literature uses the terms “procedural justice” and “pro-
cedural fairness,” likewise “distributive justice” and “distributive
fairness,” a practice we adopt in this article. As a matter of con-
vention, the term “justice” more often refers to the abstract con-
cept, whereas the term “fairness” more often refers to subjective
perceptions, but we use the terms more or less interchangeably.
4. The literature is too vast to list all of the major representative
works, and it is beyond the scope of the present article to attempt
a full taxonomy; for useful overviews, see BARBARA MELLERS &
JONATHAN BARON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY
AND APPLICATION (1993); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE (1999); JOSEPH SANDERS & V. LEE HAMILTON, HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH (2001); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW (2006); Alan J. Tomkins & Kimberly Applequist, Constructs
of Justice: Beyond Civil Litigation, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 163 (Brian H. Bornstein et
al. eds., 2008). 
5. The most influential early works, at least those arising from the
psychological research tradition, are those by JOHN THIBAULT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1975), and E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1986).
6. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive:
Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 850 (1994).
Burke and Leben’s1 White Paper on procedural justice andwhat judges can do to enhance it in the courtroom is animportant work for several reasons, two of which espe-
cially stand out. First, their paper illustrates how effectively
laboratory-based social-science research (often referred to as
basic research) and more naturalistic studies performed in real-
world contexts (often referred to as applied research) can be
combined in addressing public policy matters.2 Second, it con-
tains practical, feasible, and specific recommendations for
improving courtroom practice based on that research. We
believe that much goodwill come from Burke and Leben’s call-
ing judges’ attention to issues of procedural fairness. The pur-
pose of this commentary is not to dispute their claims regard-
ing procedural justice, but rather to discuss the related concept
of distributive justice and its implications for the courts.3
THE MANY FLAVORS OF JUSTICE
At times it seems like the field of justice research resembles
the ice cream market: Every vendor has an array of flavors, and
no one can agree on how many flavors there are or ought to be.
One encounters arguments for procedural justice, distributive
justice, corrective justice, interactional justice, restorative jus-
tice, therapeutic justice, and retributive justice, among others.4
They differ in terms of their antecedents, consequences, phe-
nomenological characteristics, motives, and situations in
which they arise; what they share is an emphasis on what is
more or less fair in some aspect or arena of interpersonal rela-
tions. Amidst this mélange of flavors, the ones with the great-
est staying power—to belabor the metaphor, the chocolate and
vanilla of the justice world—are procedural and distributive
justice.
As Burke and Leben describe, procedural justice concerns
whether the processes used to arrive at some outcome are fair,
whereas distributive justice concerns whether the outcome
itself is fair (i.e., the actual distribution of rewards, punish-
ments, or some resource). Due to the groundbreaking work
starting in the early 1980s by Tyler, Lind, Thibaut, Walker, and
others, procedural concerns have acquired increasing impor-
tance in both scientific investigation and practical contexts
(e.g., business, law enforcement)—and deservedly so.5 An
abundance of research has demonstrated that perceptions of
procedural and distributive justice are distinct psychological
constructs.6 It is precisely because of this separation between
them that individuals are more accepting of unfavorable out-
comes when procedural fairness is high, and conversely, that
they are relatively dissatisfied with favorable outcomes when
procedural fairness is low. From these observations flow, quite
logically, Burke and Leben’s recommendations for enhancing
procedural justice in the courtroom. The need to do so seems
obvious, given the high frequency of unfavorable outcomes for
someone involved: In civil disputes, at least one litigant (and
potentially both) is going to leave unhappy; in criminal cases,
convictions are necessarily unfavorable, and even acquittals
and relatively lenient sentences can carry unpleasant conse-
quences (e.g., the stigma of having been charged with and
prosecuted for a crime).
Thus, there is no denying the importance of procedural fair-
ness in the court system; yet the growing emphasis on proce-
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7. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 4; John T. Scott et al., Just Deserts: An
Experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms, 45 AMER. J. POL.
SCI. 749, 750-51 (2001).
8. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1985); NORMAN
FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY (1992); MELLERS &
BARON, supra note 4; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);
Philip Michelbach et al., Doing Rawls Justice: An Experimental
Study of Income Distribution Norms, 47 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 528
(2003); Scott et al., supra note 7. 
9. In some circumstances, the failure to reach an outcome is the out-
come. This happens, for example, when there is a hung jury, when
a law firm postpones a decision about making a junior associate a
partner, or when a university places an applicant on a waiting list.
Because these “non-decisions” nonetheless carry consequences
for those involved (e.g., the defendant still can be retried, the
associate still does not share in the firm’s profits, the applicant still
does not have a university to attend), they function as unique out-
comes and therefore do not change the analysis.
10. For a review of some of the procedural innovations that have been
tried, especially with jurors, see Monica K. Miller & Brian H.
Bornstein, Juror Stress: Causes and Interventions, 30 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 237 (2004).
11. Burke & Leben, supra note 1, at 14.
dural justice can obscure the equally important issue of dis-
tributive justice. The concern with how best to allocate
resources or outcomes has a long history, dating back at least
as far as Aristotle,7 and modern work on distributive justice—
from both theoretical and experimental perspectives—contin-
ues unabated.8 Without denying the benefits to be gained from
improving procedural justice, one could even argue that con-
cerns about distributive justice should be paramount.
Questions about process are, in a sense, contingent on ques-
tions about outcome. Unless some outcome occurs, the proce-
dures used to arrive at that outcome are moot.9 Thus, we
should not lose sight of what courts can do to enhance per-
ceptions of distributive fairness, in addition to enhancing per-
ceptions of procedural fairness.
OUTCOME VERSUS PROCESS IN THE COURTS
The outcomes that occur to citizens from actions by the jus-
tice system can be, and often are, life altering: loss of liberty,
life, or reputation; compelled or prohibited behaviors; transfer
of substantial sums of money. One can construe these out-
comes as a distribution of punishment and/or rewards to the
affected parties. Courtroom procedures, for their part, are for-
eign and time-consuming at best, and terrifying at worst. In
light of the high stakes, it would seem to be a “no-brainer” for
judges and other court personnel to make the procedures as
fair and “user-friendly” as possible, for litigants as well as other
affected parties (e.g., witnesses, jurors).10 Significantly, judges
have more leeway in the procedures they use than in the out-
comes they deliver, which are constrained by evidentiary
guidelines, legal precedent, sentencing guidelines, and the
spectre of appellate review, among other factors.
Perhaps because of these constraints, “judges focus on the
fairness of case outcomes instead of the process.”11 The prob-
lem here is not that judges focus on outcomes more than
processes, but that they focus on outcomes largely to the exclu-
sion of processes. A simple thought experiment illustrates the
desirability of focusing on outcomes more than processes.
Suppose that Defendant A and Defendant B have both been
charged with first-degree murder, a crime that they did not
commit. They are tried separately, in the same courtroom and
with the same evidence. In Defendant A’s trial, he is not
allowed to testify, the judge shows clear favoritism to the pros-
ecutor, and court personnel treat A in a rude and condescend-
ing manner. Nonetheless, the jury acquits. In Defendant B’s
trial, he is allowed to address
the court, the judge is scrupu-
lously impartial, and court per-
sonnel are extremely solicitous
and respectful. Nonetheless,
the jury convicts. Clearly, the
process in B’s trial is more fair,
and anyone would prefer the B
court’s procedures. But on the
whole (taking distributive and
procedural concerns together),
which situation is better?
Would you rather be Defendant A or Defendant B? A’s situation
seems better from a societal perspective, because the court
reached the right outcome, albeit by suboptimal procedures.
Moreover, most, if not all, people would choose to be
Defendant A rather than Defendant B. In this situation, out-
come trumps process.
Now suppose the hypothetical is the same, except that A
and B did, in fact, commit the crime. What then? Again, most,
if not all, people would choose to trade places with Defendant
A, even though, from a societal perspective, a murderer has
been set free. The manner of B’s trial might provide him some
consolation, but it is likely to offer him only small comfort. Of
course, in more ambiguous cases, outcome would not neces-
sarily trump process; and as Burke and Leben describe, a fair
process can go a long way toward softening a harsh outcome.
Similarly, an unfair process can make a positive outcome less
satisfying. But pushed to the extremes, outcome matters more
than process.
PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
As mentioned above, judges’ allocation of outcomes is con-
strained by a variety of factors. Nonetheless, except where
mandatory sentencing guidelines apply, criminal judges retain
a fair degree of discretion, and civil judges also have consider-
able flexibility in fashioning a remedy, in terms of both the type
of remedy (e.g., monetary vs. other restitution) and the
amount. In allocating some resource, decision makers can rely
on several different principles of distributive justice. When
judges mete out punishment (in criminal cases) or redistribute
money (in civil cases), it behooves them to be sensitive to the
various principles that could be applied, and the different goals
that those principles serve.
The concern with
how best to 
allocate resources
or outcomes has 
a long history,
dating back at
least as far as
Aristotle....
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12. See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 7, at 524-25; see generally MILLER,
supra note 4; RAWLS, supra note 8.
13. In practice, most “mandatory” sentencing guidelines provide at
least a little wiggle room by setting a range of allowable sentences
rather than specifying a precise, invariant sentence. These ranges
allow for the influence of other principles, such as need or merit,
in conjunction with a rough sense of equality.
14. Though even here, departures from equality may be justified by
other factors, such as the injured person’s age, showing again the
influence of the other justice principles.
15. This would especially be true in an employee-owned company,
where less productive employees share directly in their coworkers’
increased productivity.
16. In ordinary discourse, people are often tempted to say that the
family of eight deserves more, but that conflates the principle of
need with the principle of merit, or desert (discussed infra). For
present purposes, the family of eight has done nothing to make
themselves more “deserving,” beyond having produced more
mouths in need of feeding.
17. See generally RAWLS, supra note 8, at 73-74.
18. Justice preferences can be quite different in non-capitalist soci-
eties; see, e.g., Duane F. Alwin et al., Comparative Referential
Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments: An
International Comparison, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CHANGE
109  (James R. Kluegel et al. eds., 1995).
19. E.g., Michelbach et al., supra note 8, Gregory Mitchell et al.,
Judgments of Social Justice: Compromises between Equality and
Efficiency, 65 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 629 (1993); Scott et al., supra
note 7.
20. Scott et al., supra note 7, at 764; see also FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER,
supra note 8; MILLER, supra note 4; Michelbach et al., supra note
8; Mitchell et al., supra note 19.
Theoretical and experimen-
tal research on distributive jus-
tice has identified a number of
distinct principles that people
rely on in making (or in
expressing preferences for)
allocation decisions. Different
researchers use slightly differ-
ent taxonomies, but the most
commonly cited principles are
equality, efficiency, need, and
merit (also referred to as desert
or proportionality).12 Equality
dictates that all affected parties
receive the same allocation. So, for example, all workers
receive the same raise, all families on welfare receive the same
amount of food stamps, and so forth. Strict mandatory sen-
tencing is an example of the equality principle in criminal jus-
tice.13 Perhaps the best example of equality in civil contexts is
workers compensation, by which injured parties receive com-
pensation according to a predetermined schedule. In such a
system, the same injury is always worth the same amount,
regardless of individual circumstances.14
Departures from equality reflect an adherence to other jus-
tice principles. For example, a concern with efficiency means
that aggregate productivity can be increased by awarding some
individuals more of a resource than others. It might make
sense to award higher raises to more senior, more productive
employees than to less productive ones, if doing so makes
them still more productive, and the company as a whole bene-
fits.15 The goal of general deterrence in legal contexts can be
explained in terms of efficiency. One can justify punishing
some defendants—either criminally or civilly—more severely
than others, for comparable actions, if doing so would make
society as a whole function better in some way. For example, it
might make sense to force a financially robust product manu-
facturer to pay more in damages for a defective product than a
less solvent manufacturer, if requiring equal payment would
force the less solvent company out of business, thereby losing
other valuable products and services that it might provide.
Inequality can also be justified by a disparity in need. In the
food stamp example given above, one could argue that a fam-
ily of eight should receive more aid than a family of four
because the family of eight has greater needs.16 Need plays an
important role in the resolution of legal disputes, especially in
civil cases. So, for example, if the sole breadwinner in the fam-
ily of eight were incapacitated due to another’s negligence, he
or she would typically recover greater damages than the sole
breadwinner in the family of four (all else being equal).
Finally, the distribution of resources can vary according to
merit, in which some individuals deserve more/less than others.
Multifarious factors contribute to merit, subsuming things that
are both mostly innate (e.g., intelligence, beauty) and those
that are largely acquired (e.g., wealth, prestige).17 Importantly,
there is also a strong behavioral component, in terms of how
much the individual’s own actions have helped generate par-
ticular outcomes. Merit-based distribution systems are wide-
spread in capitalist societies;18 consider, for example, that most
businesses, especially in the private sector, determine salary
based primarily on an employee’s individual efforts, productiv-
ity, and success. Experimental research on distributive justice
supports the centrality of concerns about merit, especially in
terms of income distribution.19 It is also a cardinal concern in
both civil and criminal law, where it is often referred to as pro-
portionality. Thus, a civil litigant’s penalty/reward is often
explicitly tied to his or her contribution to the outcome, as in
applying comparative negligence or market share liability.
Similarly, criminal punishment is tied closely to a defendant’s
culpability (i.e., desert), and a variety of aggravating or miti-
gating factors can raise or lower the punishment.
It is clear from this brief overview that multiple distributive
justice principles are relevant to both the criminal and civil
justice systems. The choice is not simply between one or
another principle, as multiple principles can, and do, apply
simultaneously. Research on allocation preferences has shown
that individuals take a pluralistic approach and rely on multi-
ple principles in a “complex yet structured” manner.20
Although these principles lurk beneath the surface of judi-
cial decision making, they are rarely explicit. A rare instance
where a judge-like arbiter did explicitly consider which dis-
tributive norms were most appropriate occurred in the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, administered by
Special Master Kenneth Feinberg.21 The statute that enabled
the Fund22 required a calculation of each claimant’s presumed
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21. The Fund has generated considerable commentary, much of it
written from a social justice perspective. The following sources are
especially helpful: LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL K. STERN, COMPENSATION
FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS (RAND Corp. 2004); KENNETH
R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005) [hereinafter WHAT IS LIFE
WORTH]; KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF
2001 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf.;
After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the
Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2003) (special issue
on the Fund). 
22. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001).
23. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH, supra note 21, at 177-88 (on
Feinberg’s evaluation of the Fund); Brian H. Bornstein & Susan
Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive Justice in the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 75, 94 (2007) (on claimants’ perceptions).
24. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE (1992); MILLER, supra note 4;
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983); Jon Elster, Justice and the Allocation of Scarce
Resources, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 259, 259-278 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron
eds., 1993).
25. Elster, Justice and Allocation, supra note 24, at 259.
26. See generally Michelbach et al., supra note 8; Scott et al., supra
note 7; Peter B. Wood & David C. May, Racial Differences in
Perceptions of the Severity of Sanctions: A Comparison of Prison with
Alternatives, 20 JUST. Q. 605 (2003).
27. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and
Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to
Judges, 36 CT. REV. 24 (1999); DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL.,
PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF
EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY: FINAL REPORT (National Center
for State Courts, 2003).
28. Wood & May, supra note 26, at 605-606.
29. M. SOMJEN FRAZER, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY COURT MODEL IN
DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE STUDY AT THE RED
HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2006), available at
http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/Procedural_Fairn
ess.pdf. 
30. John L. Miller, Peter H. Rossi & Jon E. Simpson, Perceptions of
Justice: Race and Gender Differences in Judgments of Appropriate
Prison Sentences, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313 (1986).
31. Michelbach et al., supra note 8 at 530, 536.
economic loss based on a variety of factors (e.g., age, income),
thereby relying primarily on principles of efficiency and merit.
However, Feinberg implemented an equality norm for non-
economic loss, awarding $250,000 per victim and $100,000
per spouse and dependent child. Many claimants, and Special
Master Feinberg himself, thought the Fund should have
adhered to a principle of equality for all compensation.23 As we
discuss below, an awareness of these principles can inform
judicial performance.
Most experimental research has focused on the distribution
(or redistribution) of desirable resources (i.e., goods) rather
than the distribution of undesirable commodities, or bads. In
the context of the justice system, civil cases are concerned
mainly with the redistribution of a good (money), while crim-
inal cases are concerned mainly with the distribution of a bad
(punishment). This is an important distinction, as several the-
orists have argued that different distributive norms should pre-
dominate in allocating different types of goods or in allocating
the same good in different contexts.24 For example, Elster con-
tends that the principle of need should be central in allocating
organs for transplantation, whereas merit should prevail in
admitting students to college.25 Thus, the same principles
might reasonably not apply in civil versus criminal cases, or
even for different types of cases within each system (e.g.,
crimes against persons vs. crimes against property).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTIONS OF
DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS
The experimental literature on distributive justice shows
that people’s preferences differ depending on a number of
demographic characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, gender,
nationality, and socioeconomic status.26 As suggested by Burke
and Leben, minorities differ in their approval ratings of the
court system.27 These perceptions are based not only on the
way in which minority group members are treated by the jus-
tice system, but also the prob-
ability of an unfair outcome.
The threat of “worse results” is
most prominent for African-
Americans, who account for
almost half of the incarcerated
population and represent 41%
percent of the population on
death row.28 In general,
African-American citizens
have lower opinions of the
criminal justice system and are
less confident than others in
the neutrality and legitimacy
of the courts.29
In a study by Miller and colleagues, the researchers found
that black and white men and women differed in their recom-
mended criminal sanctions for convicted offenders.30 Whereas
blacks tended to ascribe to a justice philosophy that considered
the individual offender, whites were more likely to employ a
justice philosophy that focused on meting out punishment
that was proportionate in severity to crime seriousness. In
other words, whites’ judgments were more centered on char-
acteristics of the offense (i.e., the seriousness of the crime),
whereas blacks’ judgments were more centered on the social
characteristics of the offender. Research on justice preferences
in non-legal contexts has similarly found that individuals of
different races favor different justice principles. Specifically,
minorities are more skeptical than whites about the relation-
ship between merit and outcomes, and they are correspond-
ingly less sensitive to variations in merit.31
One’s perceptions of distributive justice outcomes will also
vary as a function of socioeconomic status, which is correlated
with race in the U.S. As blacks are considered, on average, to
be closer to crime than whites (i.e., more likely to be victim-
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32. Miller et al., supra note 30, at 316.
33. John Hagan & Celesta Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perceptions
of Criminal Justice in America, 88 AM. J. SOCIOL. 329 (1982).
34. Martha L. Henderson et al., The Impact of Race on Perceptions of
Criminal Injustice, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 447 (1997).
35. Brandon K. Applegate, Francis T. Cullen & Bonnie S. Fisher,
Public Views Toward Crime and Correctional Policies: Is There a
Gender Gap? 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 89 (2002).
36. Id. at 98.
37. Paul D. Sweeney & Dean B. McFarlin, Process and Outcome:
Gender Differences in the Assessment of Justice, 18 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 84 (1997).
38. Id. at 92.
39. Michelbach et al, supra note 8, at 536 (finding women are more
egalitarian and more sensitive to need); Scott et al., supra note 7,
at 763-64 (finding women are more egalitarian and more sensitive
to merit).
40. E.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
41. Doing so would entail a normative discussion of the principles
that the civil and criminal justice systems should adhere to in
resolving disputes, and such philosophical discursions would take
us too far afield from our more modest aim of describing the
importance of distributive justice for the courts.
42. It is theoretically possible for both sides to leave the process satis-
fied with the outcome. In a criminal case, for example, the prose-
cution and the defendant might both be satisfied with conviction
on a lesser charge, as opposed to either conviction on the most
serious charge (best outcome from the prosecution’s perspective)
or an acquittal (best outcome from the defendant’s perspective).
Similarly, a civil plaintiff and defendant might both be pleased that
the award was not more (from the defendant’s perspective) or less
(from the plaintiff’s perspective) than it might have been other-
wise. However, such “win-win” situations rarely, if ever, happen.
More often, both sides would experience disappointment from
these sorts of compromise outcomes. See Jessica Pearson, An
Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. SYS. J., 420
(1982); Val Reid, Small Claims, Big Questions, LEGAL ACTION,
March 2007, at 11, 11-12, available at http://www.asauk.org.uk/
fileLibrary/pdf/smclmsbq.pdf.
ized, arrested, and incarcer-
ated), one’s proximity to the
criminal justice system clearly
influences an individual’s view
of appropriate penal sanc-
tion.32 Research shows a dif-
ference in the fairness of out-
come ratings between whites
and affluent blacks33 and also
between whites and low-
income blacks.34 As one might
conclude, race and socioeco-
nomic status are intimately
tied and pose a “double threat”
for minority offenders. 
Race is not the only demographic variable that influences
attitudes toward the criminal justice system. Men and women
have also been found to vary in their views toward crime and
correctional policies.35 Whereas men are more likely to sup-
port capital punishment as a means for corrective action,
women tend to focus more on the individual and show greater
support for rehabilitative efforts for criminal offenders. Both
agree that the government should punish and hold convicted
criminals accountable, but women favor a standard of care that
provides assistance to meet the needs of offenders, suggesting
that their goals in distributing penalties are different from
men’s.36
This attitudinal difference between men and women in rec-
ommendations for legal outcomes is also prominent in other
domains. For example, Sweeney and McFarlin found gender
differences in men’s and women’s reliance on distributive or
procedural justice in expressing job satisfaction.37 For women,
fair processes were more important in their job satisfaction
evaluations, lending to a procedural justice philosophy.
Satisfaction for men, however, was more outcome-oriented
and therefore based more on an assessment of distributive fair-
ness.38 Women show a stronger preference for equality than
men, and they are also more sensitive to variations in merit and
need.39 Scott and colleagues speculate that women’s greater
sensitivity to factors such as merit and need might reflect more
general gender differences in moral reasoning, in particular a
greater sensitivity among women to contextual features.40
There is reason to suppose that gender differences in distribu-
tive justice may be applied to other contexts, such as legal dis-
pute resolution.
Overall, these findings on individual differences suggest
two things. First, litigants will have different expectations and
preferences about what sorts of outcomes are most fair,
depending on their demographic characteristics. Although
there are criminal and civil codes, sentencing practices, and
informal norms that serve to ensure fair treatment under the
law, one person’s notion of what is fair is not necessarily the
same as another’s. Second, judges who come from different
backgrounds will have a different sense of what constitutes a
fair and just outcome. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Burke and Leben conclude their article by offering a num-
ber of recommendations for change. Specifically, they ask:
“What can an individual judge, individual court, court admin-
istrators, researchers, judicial educators, and court leaders do
to enhance procedural fairness?” We have no quarrel with their
recommendations, the vast majority of which are reasonable,
feasible, inexpensive, and likely to accomplish their desired
aim. We do not make analogous recommendations for what
judges and courts can do to enhance distributive fairness;41
rather, in this concluding section we highlight the importance
of distributive justice with the goal of raising awareness of the
factors that can influence perceived outcome fairness.
A hallmark characteristic of both the criminal and civil jus-
tice systems is that only one side wins; and often both sides
walk away disappointed.42 Criminal convictions are “wins” for
the prosecution (and are touted as such in election campaigns)
and “losses” for defendants; whereas most civil cases are essen-
tially zero-sum games, with one party’s losses mirroring the
opposing party’s gains. Thus, there would seem to be little
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doubt that aspirations for, and satisfaction with, particular out-
comes reign supreme in litigants’ minds. Distributive justice
might not be litigants’ favorite justice flavor, but it is the flavor
they care about the most. It is therefore the flavor that judges
should care about the most as well.
Procedures of the utmost fairness do not necessarily mean
that litigants will readily accept a court’s outcome or decision.
Hence it is important for legal advisors, professionals, and
judges to be willing to explain outcomes and to express a will-
ingness to answer litigants’ questions, particularly if an out-
come is undesirable or unexpected. As mentioned in the indi-
vidual differences section, supra, it is important further for
legal professionals to recognize that litigants are not cookie-
cutter replicas. What makes people different will also influence
how they approach, interpret, and understand the law. This
will help to ensure that litigants have a better understanding of
their outcomes and why those particular outcomes were
reached, which would potentially lead to greater satisfaction
with the justice system and fewer appeals. 
Burke and Leben also emphasize the importance of social
science research in helping legal professionals understand how
the general population interprets fairness in the legal system.
We support this proposition with respect to distributive, as
well as procedural fairness. We similarly recommend that legal
professionals not only educate themselves by becoming famil-
iar with the existing literature, but also support ongoing
research. There are two ways in which judges can facilitate this
goal. First, they can allow researchers to survey litigants about
their perception of legal outcomes as well as legal procedures.
Second, they can serve as research participants themselves.
Social scientists who conduct research on the legal system
know much less about how judges make decisions than they
do about how juries (and especially individual jurors) make
decisions. This state of affairs exists for a number of reasons,
but primarily because compared to the average juror (or mock
juror), judges are fewer, busier, harder to obtain access to, and
less swayed by offers of token compensation for participating
in research studies.
As fact finders, judges and juries are similar in many
respects, yet they differ in subtle ways as well.43 Judges differ
from jurors in terms of their training, background, legal
knowledge, and experience with similar cases; evidentiary
rules also mean that judges might make decisions on slightly
different constellations of facts than juries. Moreover, precisely
because of their experience and training, judges are much
more likely than jurors to have reflected on the nature of their
task and to have formulated principles to which they adhere in
adjudicating the cases before them. Interviews with judges, as
well as judge-jury comparisons, could shed a great deal of light
on the justice principles that legal fact finders rely on in deter-
mining trial outcomes. Reflection by judges on the principles
and goals that they use, often unconsciously, in reaching ver-
dicts would produce a more thoughtful and better informed
judiciary.
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